Turkey’s strategic tangle

For months, Turkey’s government has been trying to accomplish three major tasks simultaneously or nearly so in order to solidify its hold on power at home and enhance its influence in the broader region. Its three-pronged approach to fulfilling that goal consists of seeking to 1) crush democracy and destroy the political opposition in Turkey by bringing serious criminal charges against Ekrem İmamoğlu, the popular mayor of Istanbul and a leading figure in the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP); 2) bring Turkey’s pro-Kurdish party, the Peoples’ Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party), into a coalition in order to win the next national election with current President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan continuing his 22-year rule, essentially making him “leader for life”; and 3) leverage its new and powerful influence in Syria to neutralize Kurdish power in the northeast and in the Syrian national government.

Erdoğan is closer to President Donald Trump than he was to President Joe Biden. He hopes their relationship will allow the sale of F-35’s to Turkey without having to remove prohibited Russian S-400 missiles. He also believes Trump might end the partnership with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) since the SDF is merging with the national Syrian armed forces on the premise that the Syrian government can handle the Islamic State (ISIS) threat. He believes that Trump will not criticize his domestic anti-democracy measures. He will have to explain how Turkey will assist the Syrian government in achieving its top priority — the stabilization of the country — while remaining consistent with American concerns for Syrian recovery rather than focusing only on Turkey’s interests. He will also need to demonstrate that Turkey will work with Israel to avoid splitting Syria into zones of control that would severely weaken the Damascus government.

Six national polls taken after İmamoğlu’s arrest give his party a lead in every one. Thousands of Turks have gone out into the streets to condemn İmamoğlu’s jailing on corruption charges — the largest protests in more than a decade, since the massive Gezi Park demonstrations of 2013. This arrest is the latest move in Erdoğan’s two-decade-long campaign to wipe out democratic opposition to his rule. He was never entirely successful. Throughout that time, the democratic opposition has not been smothered, and Erdoğan’s appeal gradually weakened. And so, no longer as certain of his political future, several weeks ago Erdoğan struck at the heart of the democratic opposition. Since detaining the Istanbul mayor, Erdoğan has made no concessions to the opposition and aggressively counters the demonstrations.

Domestic issues

Since Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its majority in Turkey’s parliament in 2015, it has grown dependent on another political faction, the ultranationalist Nationalist Action Party (MHP), led by Devlet Bahçeli. The MHP allied with AKP in the 2018 general elections and has remained in the governing alliance since that time. Bahçeli’s power and influence is now indispensable to maintaining Erdoğan’s dominant position in Turkish politics.

In a move clearly coordinated with President Erdoğan, on Oct. 22, 2024, Bahçeli invited Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned head of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), designated by both Turkey and the United States as a terrorist group, to speak to the Turkish parliament on condition that Öcalan would call on the PKK to disband. Bahçeli then invited the DEM Party to “become a party of Turkey.” A parliamentary coalition including AKP, MHP, and DEM would virtually ensure Erdoğan’s reelection to the presidency.

This alliance could enable either of two options. First, 360 members could call for early elections and allow Erdoğan, who is about to be termed out of office, to exploit an inadvertent loophole in the constitution to run again — and perhaps do this multiple times. That option would require the votes of the DEM party. The second option would be to use the three parties’ votes in the legislature to push a new constitutional amendment to remove Erdoğan’s current term limit. In either case, support from the DEM Party is needed to cement Erdoğan’s political position for the foreseeable future.

Focus on the Kurds

On Feb. 25, Öcalan from prison called on the PKK to disarm and dissolve. The PKK announced on March 1 that it would comply and declared a unilateral cease-fire. Ankara considers the SDF in Syria’s northeast as linked with the PKK and applies its requirements for disarming equally to both organizations. Öcalan did not mention the Syrian Kurdish forces in his own announcement. SDF leader Mazloum Abdi has said that the Öcalan statement does not apply to his group.

On March 10, Abdi agreed with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to integrate the SDF into the structure of the new Syrian Arab Republic, a deal which effectively ended the Kurdish autonomous administration project. Abdi seems to agree as well that its members will join the Syrian army individually, not as a separate armed force. It is not clear, however, that all the SDF components endorse the agreement, and difficult negotiations may lie ahead. All non-Syrian PKK members are also to leave Syria. Taken together, these steps comprise a significant win for Ankara.

Ankara is still nervous about the deal, however. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan made a quick trip to Syria on March 14 to announce that Turkey will “closely monitor” the agreement and continues to call for the SDF to disarm and dissolve. The long period for implementation of the March 10 deal and some indications that not all SDF components are on board leave open final agreement on a number of details. Syria seems to hope that resolution of the SDF/Kurdish issue will strengthen Damascus’ effort to consolidate its rule and address internal security challenges.

Turkey has a good reason to not push too far or too fast with Syria. Ankara wants the more than 3 million Syrian refugees in Turkey to return home, and the government has a clear picture of what can upset this goal: namely, renewed violence, sectarian divisions, and instability. On Dec. 26, Damascus said 14 of its security forces were killed by Alawite loyalists of the old regime. Later, following a series of coordinated ambushes of government security forces in Latakia and parts of Tartous by regime loyalists, Syrian forces carried out serious attacks against Alawites from March 6 to 9. The Alawite community in Syria fears further Syrian transitional government reprisals. The March 10 agreement between the Syrian government and the SDF benefited not only Turkey but also the Syrian government. With ethnic tensions still high in Syria, going forward carefully will help Ankara help Damascus, not make the new government’s job more difficult.

Relations with Israel and the US

Turkey also faces difficulties with Israel. The issue of Palestine had long roiled their bilateral relations, and President Erdoğan’s Oct. 23, 2023, endorsement of Hamas as a liberation movement to codify his opposition to Israel put an even finer point on this chronic source of tensions. Yet the two countries have also been at loggerheads over Syria, made worse in recent months by Israel’s indefinite occupation (with American consent) of additional territory in Syria and Israel’s friendly ties with the Syrian Kurds and Druze. Further exacerbating the situation, in past weeks, Israel executed more than 70 ground operations and over 31 airstrikes in Syria. The US has begun a gradual withdrawal of some forces from Syria, worrying Israel. Israel struck three sites in Syria that Turkey had inspected as possible new bases and has demanded the total demilitarization of the southern portion of the country.

Turkey and Israel are now talking in Azerbaijan about the presence of their respective forces in Syria. Israel opposes Turkish bases in certain key areas. The US has volunteered to mediate the dispute. Should these talks expand, Israel and Turkey could address larger Middle East questions and begin to lower the bilateral temperature.

Israel remains deeply skeptical about the Damascus government, given the latter’s history, and about its ability to reconcile Syria’s ethnic and religious minorities to support the new regime. The US, on the other hand, generally agrees with Turkey that Syria should be helped to become a stable and prosperous country. But Washington is taking a slower approach, while Ankara has been pressing for action quickly.

At the moment, Turkey seems to be putting its own security goals ahead of Syria’s need to keep the national reconciliation and recovery processes on track, which may complicate Turkey’s dealings with both the US and Israel on these issues. For example, the Turkish demand that the SDF disarm could prevent President Sharaa from offering critical accommodations to the Kurds necessary to further the stabilization of Syria. This would draw Turkey and Israel into direct confrontation over the future of Turkish influence in the country. As such, Turkey is doing the government in Damascus no favors by producing a deep dispute with Israel. Nor is the United States interested in leaving the Kurds helpless before the Turks. Finally, the US will have to deal with the Turkish-Israeli competition in any case if it wants a successful Syrian state to emerge.

Recent reports indicated that Turkey’s president may travel to the US later this month, though none of the details have apparently been worked out to date. If Erdoğan goes to Washington, he will look for progress on the withdrawal of American troops from Syria, which he fully endorses, the revocation of US support for the SDF, the lifting of American sanctions on Syria, and a US agreement to sell Ankara the F-35 fighter without Turkey having to give up the S-400 missile-defense system it had previously purchased from Russia. If possible, he will also want an expression of support directly from President Trump on his handling of the current Turkish domestic crisis.

On the F-35 issue, Turkey continues to decline to remove the Russian S-400 missile-defense system — a US pre-condition to the sale — having claimed in 2019 and again in 2022 that it is a “done deal.” Ankara now plans to deploy an S-400 system in central Syria, near locations recently struck by Israel, reportedly as part of Turkey’s wider plans to establish long-term military installations on Syrian soil. These designs seem to contradict at least the spirit of a Nov. 26, 2024, speech by Defense Minister Yaşar Güler to Turkish lawmakers that asserted Ankara and Washington had agreed Turkey would store the S-400 system, which would in turn free up F-35 sales. If Turkey’s position is that the alleged agreement with Washington permits it to deploy the S-400 outside its borders, this critically undermines the assurances Ankara had offered Washington concerning the offending Russian weapons. The US has no compelling reason to make this sale to Turkey until and unless the latter complies with the American legislative conditions, which require it to destroy or hand over the entirety of the S-400 missile-defense system.

The atmosphere in Washington, however, seems to be positive. The two presidents spoke on March 16, just two days before the process began to permanently remove İmamoğlu from the political scene. The following week, Trump’s special envoy for the Middle East, Steve Witkoff, said the Trump-Erdoğan conversation was “amazing and transformational” and added that there was “very good news” coming from Turkey. On March 25, after Ankara had taken the final measures to block İmamoğlu from presidential contention, Trump himself praised Erdoğan as a “good leader.” Rumors have circulated that the US and Turkey are planning to call for disarmament of both the PKK and Hamas.

Turkey prefers to follow an independent track

In addition to ramping up attacks on Turkish democracy — as vividly highlighted most recently by İmamoğlu’s arrest — there is considerable evidence that Ankara is increasingly pursuing an imperial future, despite frequent denials. Turkey is an à la carte member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), while benefiting from Russia greatly during the Russo-Ukrainian war and enforcing no NATO-agreed sanctions. It expanded its regional reach as a consequence of the Azerbaijani-Armenian war by training and equipping Azerbaijan’s army and putting Armenia in a difficult spot with few if any options. It now hopes to reap major rewards from the windfall victory in Syria. It has become one of Israel’s major regional opponents in the Middle East, continuing to support Hamas and appealing to the Arab street for popular backing.

Militarily, economically, and politically, Turkey has a long-term plan to move into position to exert its own national influence regionally and beyond without reliance on Europe or the United States. Indeed, it has been seeking its own independent place in the sun since the beginning of Erdoğan’s rise. Over the coming weeks and months, the outcome of discussions between Ankara and Washington could have far-reaching consequences for the bilateral relationship as well as the broader Middle East. Just handling the Israeli, Syrian, and Turkish interests in Syria will be a major challenge for the US. Doing Turkey favors to win support is not a good choice. Whatever “transformational” means for this administration, it should consist of practical, realizable goals for regional stability and progress.

 

Amb. Robert Pearson is a Distinguished Diplomatic Fellow at MEI. His areas of interest include Turkey’s relations with the EU, Russia, the Middle East, and Central and East Asia, with particular emphasis on the United States. Amb. Pearson is a retired professional foreign service officer who served as US ambassador to Turkey from 2000 to 2003. 

Photo by Kemal Aslan/AFP via Getty Images